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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Even with its limitations, the decision is to be welcomed as settling a point
of law which has been moot. As a practical matter the existence of this
power in the trustee is advisable, since it makes it more likely that the in-
surance will be placed with strong companies which pay losses promptly.
The commissions which the trustee receives from the insurance companies do
not increase the premiums which the borrower would have to pay if he took
out the insurance himself, while they may serve as an inducement for trustees
to act for lower fees, thus lessening the present heavy burden of fees which
the prospective borrower must pay. G. W. S., '33.
FRAUD-PROMISE WITH PRESENT INTENTION NOT TO PERFORM.-Plaintiff
was an experienced banker, capable of managing a banking business. The
defendants, a group of stockholders in a bank, pooled 250 shares of the
capital stock, and appointed Cooke to sell it at a fixed price of $135 per share.
The market value of the stock was $95, which fact was known to plaintiff.
He was induced to purchase the stock, and pay this premium on it by a prom-
ise on the part of the defendants that inasmuch as they held the majority of
the stock in the bank they would make him managing officer of the bank at
a salary of about $300 per month. The defendants, at the time of making
the promise did not intend to perform. The court sustained a demurrer to
plaintiff's petition. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court holding:
Fraud cannot be predicated upon a mere promise though accompanied by
present intention not to perform. Reed v. Cooke (Mo. 1932) 55 S. W. (2d)
275.
It is a well known and accepted rule in the law of fraud and deceit that
an actionable representation must relate to past or existing facts and cannot
consist of mere broken promises, unfulfilled predictions, or erroneous con-
jectures as to future events. 26 C. J. 1087. However, to this rule there are
several well recognized exceptions. State of mind can be just as much of an
existing fact as the state of digestion. Edgington v. Fitzmaurice. ( Eng.)
29 Ch. D. 459; Deyo v. Hudson (1919) 225 N. Y. 602, 122 N. E. 635; Swift 'v.
Rounds (1897) 19 R. I. 527, 35 Atl. 45. This rule has been extended to al-
low recovery on the basis of fraud and deceit where a promise has been made
with a present intent of future breach. Wright v. Barnard (D. C. D. Del.,
1917) 248 F. 756; Birmingham Warehouse Co. v. Elyton Land Co. (1891) 93
Ala. 549, 9 So. 235; Olson v. Smith (1912) 116 Minn. 430, 134 N. W. 117.
As pointed out by the dissenting judge in the principal case, twenty-one
American states, England, and the Federal courts, have adopted this view.
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin originally
held, to the contrary. But in each of these states more modern decisions
have abandoned the former position so that now it is probable that recovery
could likewise be had there upon such a state of facts. Bowe v. Gage
(1906) 127 Wis. 245, 106 N. W. 1074.
Other authorities hold that a misrepresentation of intention is purely
promissory and is therefore not remediable fraud. Farris v. Strong (1897)
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24 Colo. 107, 48 Pac. 963; Miller v. Sutliff (1911) 241 fl. 521, 94 N. E. 651;
Hunt v. Lewis (1914) 87 Vt. 528, 90 AtI. 578. The reason for this view is
stated in Miller v. Sutliff, supra, "If an intention not to perform constituted
fraud, every transaction might be avoided where the facts justified an in-
ference that a party did not intend to pay the consideration, or keep his
agreement." This seems to be nothing more than an assurance that the
doctrine of caveat emptor will be maintained in all its ancient viciousness.
In Missouri there are cases holding that a promise made with present in-
tent to break it is sufficient fraud to warrant a recission of the contract.
Laswell v. National Handle Co. (1910) 147 Mo. App. 497, 126 S. W. 969;
Culbertson v. Young (1901) 86 Mo. App. 277. However the rule seems to
be settled that "a promise made without intention to fulfill is not a misrepre-
sentation of an existing fact", within the rule that a misrepresentation of
fact is ground for recission. Younger v. Hoge (1908) 211 Mo. 444, 111 S. W.
20;Estes v. DesnoyersShoeCo. (1900) 155 Mo.577,56S.W.316. As was point-
ed out by the dissenting judge, the cases in which this minority rule has been
applied do not upon their facts call for its application. Furthermore, in the
instant case, the matter was before the court on a demurrer so that the issue
of legal sufficiency was clear cut. Had the court seen fit to do so, it could have
established the majority rule in this state, without necessarily overruling
previously decided cases, and the opportunity to decide this specific question
of law alone was afforded. It is somewhat to be regretted that Judge Gantt
was unable to prevail upon his associates to adopt the views which he ex-
pounds in the dissenting opinion, and thereby drawing this jurisdiction away
from old common law rules which favored chicanery. It seems hard to per-
ceive, from a practical point of view at least, how the court can refuse to
recognize the fraudulent nature of a promise made with present intent not
to perform. A. P., '33.
INTERNAL REVENUE-REFUNDS--AMENDMENT AFTER TIME FOR FLING
NEw CLAIM HAS ExPiRED.-Two recent decisions by the Supreme Court of
the United States, both written by Mr. Justice Cardozo, have served to clarify
the law of this important subject, although they have left it in a position
which seems highly illogical. The recent revenue acts have contained pro-
visions that in order to secure a refund a claim, in the form prescribed by
the regulations of the Treasury Department, must be made within a certain
period after the tax has been paid. The period for filing these claims with
the commissioner of internal revenue has varied. Under the Revenue Acts
of 1926 and 1928 it was four years, but the Revenue Act of 1932 reduced the
period to two years. 44 Stat. 66 (1926), 45 Stat. 871 (1928), 11 U. S. C.
1065b; Revenue Act of 1932 sec. 322.
In the first case the claim had been filed within the proper time, but was
too general to meet the tests of the regulation. Nevertheless, the federal
agents investigated the claim and were apparently about to allow it, when
the commissioner discovered it was not in the proper form. He notified the
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